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UNITED STATES v. ARMSTRONG
116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
I. FACTS
In April 1992, Christopher Armstrong, Aaron
Hampton, Freddie Mack, and Robert Rozelle ,respondents, were indicted in the Federal District
Court for the Central District of California for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute over fifty grams of cocaine base
(commonly known as "crack) in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§841 and 846. ' The charges against respondents resulted from the infiltration of a suspected
crack ring by members of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and California
Police Department, Narcotics Division.2
In response to the indictment, respondents filed
a motion for discovery or, in the alternative, for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that they
were selected for federal prosecution because they
were black.3 Respondents supported the motion
with an affidavit from a paralegal specialist employed
with the Office of the Federal Public Defender.4 The
affidavit alleged that in every 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846 case dosed by that office in 1991, the defendant had been black. The government opposed the
motion, claiming that no evidence or allegation existed of the government's acting unfairly or failing
to prosecute similarly situated non-black defendants. 6 The district court rejected the government's
argument and granted respondents' motion. It ordered the government to
(1) provide a list of all cases from the last three
years in which the Government charged both
cocaine and firearms offenses; (2) identify the
race of the defendants in those cases; (3) identify what levels of law enforcement were involved in the investigation of those cases; (4)
explain its criteria for deciding to prosecute
those defendants. 7

IUnited States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483

(1996).
2
3

Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1483.
116 S. Ct. at 1483.

4Id.
5Id.

"Id. at 1484.

The government moved for reconsideration of
the discovery order.8Accompanying the motion were
affidavits and other evidence explaining why the
gonvernment had chosen to prosecute respondents. 9
In the affidavits, federal and local agents participating in the case stated in affidavits that race had played
no role in their investigation.' 0 In addition, an assistant United States attorney affirmed that the decision to prosecute respondents met the general criteria for prosecution:
[Tihere was over 100 grams of cocaine base involved, over twice the threshold necessary for
a ten year mandatory minimum sentence; there
were multiple sales involving multiple defendants, thereby indicating a fairly substantial
crack cocaine ring... the overall evidence in
the case was extremely strong including several
audio and video tapes of defendants.., and
several of the defendants had criminal histories
including narcotics and firearms violations."
The government also submitted sections of a published 1989 Drug Enforcement Administration report which stated that the manufacture and distriby Jabution of cocaine base (crack) is controlled
2
maican, Haitian, and Black Street gangs.'
In response to the government's motion for reconsideration, respondents' attorney, acting as a witness, submitted an affidavit alleging that an intake
coordinator at a drug treatment center reported an
equal number of caucasians and minorities using and
dealing crack.'3 The respondents also submitted an
affidavit from a criminal defense attorney who stated
that in his experience, many non-black defendants
charged with possession of crack were prosecuted
in state court, while black crack defendants were
prosecuted in federal court.14 Sentencing in the federal system is harsher than most state systems be-

7Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
0

1 1d.
"Id.

12J. Featherly &Hill, Crack Cocaine Overview 1989.
13Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1484.
14116 S. Ct. at 1484.

cause of sentencing guidelines, inandatory minimum
sentencing, and the absence of parole. The criminal
defense attorney further stated that federal crack
defendants, who were almost always black, were
punished far more severely than federal powder
cocaine defendants, who were-mostly non-black."
The district court denied the government's motion for reconsideration. 16 When the government
indicated it would not comply with the court's discovery order, the court dismissed the case.' 7 On appeal, a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.s
The court of appeals held that the "defendants must
provide a colorable basis for believing that others
similarly situated have not been prosecuted" in order to obtain discovery on a selective-prosecution
claim.' 9 The court relied on the reasoning in United
States v. Bourgeois.20 In Bourgeois, federal and local

law enforcement agents arrested more than 100 gang
members in South Central Los Angeles as a part of
operation "Streetsweep."2' The government prosecuted ten arrestees, including defendant Bourgeois,
for federal firearm violations. 22All ten persons were
black men. Defendant Bourgeois claimed that the
decision to prosecute him was unconstitutionally
based on race and sought discovery of government
documents about operation "Streetsweep."23 The
United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the threshold necessary to obtain discovery in
selective prosecution should not be so high as to
require establishing a prima facie case. 24 Instead, a
defendant had only to present specific facts which
established a colorable basis for the existence of discriminatory effect. 2s The Ninth Circuit denied Bourgeois' discovery motion. It found that he failed to
establish a colorable basis of discriminatory effect
because he failed to show that similarly situated non26
blacks had not been prosecuted.
The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en
banc 27The en banc panel affirmed the district court,
'Id. (citing Newton, Harsher Crack Sentences Criticized as RacialInequity, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 23,1992,
at 1).
16 Id.
17Id.

18 See United States v.Armstrong, 21 F.3d 1431, 1438

(1994) [hereinafter Armstrong I].
19ArmnstrongI,21 F.3d at 1436 (citing United States v.
Wayte, 710 E2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983)).
20 United States v. Bourgeois,964 E2d 935 (9th Cir.

1992).

21964
22

Id.

F.2d at 936.

holding that the defendant was not required to demonstrate the government's failure to prosecute similarly situated persons.2 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the appropriate standard for granting discovery in a selectiveprosecution claim.
II. HOLDING
The Court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(c) authorized defendants
to examine government documents material to
the preparation of their defense against the
government's case-in-chief 29 However, Rule 16
did not permit examination of government documents that were material to the preparation of
selective-prosecution claims. 30 To obtain discovery in a selective-prosecution claim, respondents
must provide some evidence that tends to show
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.3 '
In order to show discriminatory effect, respondents had to prove that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted
but were not.32 Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
33
Breyer concurred with the majority opinion.
III. ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
A. FEDERAL RULE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 governs
discovery in criminal cases. In pertinent part, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1) (c) reads:
Upon request of the defendant the government
shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy
or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places,
or copies or portions thereof, which are within
3Id. at 937.

24

Id. at 939.
at 938 (citing United States v. Balk, 706 F.2d
1056,26 1060 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 941.
27 United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (1995)
2s Id.

{hereinafter ArmstrongII].
28AmstrongII, 48 F.3d at 1516.

29Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
30116 S. Ct. at 1485.
3"Id. at 1488.

32
Id.
33

This case comment does not discuss the opinions
of Justices Souter and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer concurred

the possession, custody or control of the govemment, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant's defense or are intended
for use by the government as evidence in chief
at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to
the defendant.
Respondents contended that Rule 16(a)(1)(c)
granted them discovery of documents which discussed the government's prosecution strategy for
cocaine cases because these documents were material to respondents' selective-prosecution
claims. 34 Rule 16 allows discovery of documents,
"material to the preparation of defendant's de35
fense," not to the preparation of related claims.
However, respondents offered their selectiveprosecution claim as a defense. 36 The court rejected respondents' argument because the
"defendant's defense" language of Rule 16 refers
to a defendant's affirmative response to the
government's case-in-chief. 37 The court stated:
While it might be argued that as a general matter, the concept of a "defense" includes any
claim that is a "sword", challenging the
prosecution's conduct of the case, the term may
encompass only the narrower class of "shield"
claims, which refute the government's argu-

in the majority opinion but wrote separately because
of his view that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
does not limit a defendant's discovery rights to documents
related to the government's case-in-chief A-nstrong, 116
S. Ct. at 1489. He stated that a defendant's defense can
take many forms, only one of which is a response to the
case-in-chief 116 S. Ct. at 1490. Defendant's defense can
also include an affirmative defense, an unrelated claim of
constitutional right, or a rebuttal which anticipates a government rebuttal. Id. Justice Breyer also stated that the
discovery sought byArmstrong did not fall under the privilege protecting work product. Id. at 1491. However, he
agreed with the denial of discovery because defendants
did not satisfy the materiality requirement of Rule 16. Id.
34
Arnstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1485.
3s116 S. Ct. at 1485.
3
6Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.

39
Id.
40

1d.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
Petitioner in Wayte wrote several letters to government
officials stating that he had not registered with Selective
Service and did not intend to do so. Wayte, 470 U.S. at
601. His letter was added to a file of others who had informed the government of their unwillingness to register
"1

ments that the defendant committed the crime
charged. Rule 16(a)(1)(c) tends to support the
"shield- only" reading."
The court also relied on the language of Rule
16(a)(2) which exempts government work product
or documents made in connection with the investi39
gation of the case from inspection by the defense.
The court stated that respondents' construction of
"defense" would allow all defendants to examine
Such a construction, it
government work product.
40
found, was implausible.
B. STANDARD FOR GRANTING
DISCOVERY IN A SELECTIVEPROSECUTION CLAIM
The Attorney General and United States attorneys have broad discretion to enforce the nation's
criminal laws. 4' They are constitutionally and statutorily responsible for prosecuting all offenses against
the United States.42 So long as there is probable cause
to believe that an accused has committed an offense,
the decision whether or not to prosecute and what
charge to bring before a Grand Jury generally rests
with the prosecutor.43 However, a prosecutor's discretion is subject to the constitutional constraints
imposed by the equal protection component of the
with Selective Service. 470 U.S. at 601. The government
adopted a "passive enforcement" policy under which it
would prosecute only persons named in the file Id. After
several attempts to register these young men, the United
States attorneys began indicting them for failing to register with Selective Service. Id. at 603. Petitioner moved
for dismissal of the indictment for selective prosecution.
Id. at 604. He claimed that he and others in the Selective
Service file were vocal opponents of Selective Service and
were being singled out for asserting their First Amendment rights. Id. The Court upheld the court of appeals'
denial of the motion stating, "In our criminal justice system, the government retains broad discretion as to whom
to prosecute." Id. at 607.
42 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 ([The President] shall
take care that the laws be faithfully executed). See also 28
U.S.C. §516 ("the conduct of litigation in which the United
States . . . is a party... is reserved to officers of the
Department of Justice under the direction of the Attorney General; 28 U.S.C. §547(1) ("except as provided by
law, each United States Attorney within his district shall.
prosecute for all offenses against the United States').
43
See Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
Respondent Hayes was indicted on charges of uttering a
forged instrument in amount of $88.30. Id. at 358. Prosecutor offered to recommend sentence of five years if
Hayes would plead guilty. Id. If he pled not guilty, the

Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 44 Thus, the
decision whether to prosecute may not be based on
an impermissible standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification. 45 In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,46 the court stated," a defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is
directed so exclusively against a particular class of
persons ...with a mind so unequal and oppressive
that the system of prosecution amounts to a practical denial of equal protection of the law."47 In order
to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not
violated the equal protection clause, a criminal defendant must present "clear evidence" to the con48
trary.

A selective prosecution claim asks a court to
exercise judicial power over the executive branch.
The United States Supreme Court expressed its hesitancy to examine the decision whether to prosecute
in Wayte v. United States, noting that a prosecutor's
broad discretion makes it ill suited to judicial review. 49 Examining questions about the prosecution's
general deterrence value, the government's enforcement priorities, and a case's relationship to the
government's overall enforcement plan is not the
kind of inquiry that courts are competent to undertake. 0 Furthermore, examining the basis of
prosecutorial delays in criminal proceedings, threat-

ens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the
prosecutor's motives and decision making to outside inquiry, and it may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the government's enforce5
mentpolicy. 1
Because the process of discovery diverts government resources from a case and could reveal the
prosecution's strategy, the showing necessary to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution claim is a
demanding one. A claimant must put forth some
evidence that tends to show (1) that the
prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and
(2) that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."2 To establish racially discriminatory effect, the
claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted. 3 In
Armstrong II, 4 the Ninth Circuit erroneously held
that a defendant may establish discriminatory effect without evidence that the government failed to
prosecute similarly situated persons of other races.15
The court of appeals reached its conclusion based
on the presumption that people of all races commit
every type of crime and that one category of crime
is not exclusive to any particular racial group. 6 The
United States Supreme Court opposed this proposition with recent statistics of the United States Sentencing Commission. Those statistics showed that
larity supports official acts of public officers, and, in absence of clear evidence to contrary, a court will presume
that they have properly discharged their official duties).
49 Wayte, 470 U.S. at 598.

prosecutor would seek an indictment under the Habitual
Criminal Act. Id. Under the Act, Hayes would be subject
to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 359.
Hayes pled not guilty. Id. Hayes objected that his indictment under the Act violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the
prosecutor's conduct was not unconstitutional. Id. at 365.
44See United States v. Batchelde, 442 U.S. 114, 125
(1979).
4
1See Oylerv. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). Petitioner

ing ordinance unconstitutional because the petitioner
failed to allege that the conditions and practices to which

Oyler was convicted of second degree murder which car-

ordinance was directed did not exist exclusively among

ried a penalty of five to eighteen years. Oyler, 368 U.S. at
449. The Court determined that he had thrice been convicted of crimes, and it sentenced him to life imprisonment under the West Virginia habitual criminal statute.
368 U.S. at 450. Oyler then filed petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the statute had been applied only
to a minority of persons, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
The Court
found no constitutional violation because the petitioner
did not allege that the statute was deliberately applied
according to an unjustifiable standard such as race or religion.46Id. at 455.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
47

the Chinese and that the ordinance was not enforced
against some non-Chinese offenders). Petitioner in Ah Sin
sought a writ of habeas corpus seeking discharge from

YickWo, 118 U.S. at 373.
41 See United States v. Chemical Foundation,272 U.S.

1, 14-15 (1926) (holding that the presumption of regu-

50470
U.S at 607.
51

1d.

52
Oyler v. Boyles;
53

368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
SeeAh Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905) (hold-

imprisonment. Ah Sin. 198 U.S. at 503. He was impris-

oned under a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting persons from setting up gambling tables in rooms barricaded
to stop police from entering. 198 U.S. at 505. The petition alleged that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution because it deprived plaintiff of equal protection. Id. at 506. Specifically, petitioner

alleged that the ordinance was enforced exclusively against
persons of Chinese heritage. Id.
S4Armstrong If, 48 F.3d 1508.
55
6 Armstrong, 116
1

S. Ct. at 1488.
116 S. Ct. at 1488.

90 percent of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack
cocaine trafficking were black.5 7 The statistics also
showed that 93.4 percent of convicted LSD dealers
were white.5s The court of appeals also based its
conclusion on concerns about the evidentiary obstacles defendants face in a selective prosecution
claim. 9 The court noted the notorious difficulty of
proving race discrimination,6' stating that
[t]he broad discretion that prosecutors possess
over charging decisions means that they alone
will often possess the only information that
would demonstrate such discrimination. As a
result, the data necessary to a showing of selective prosecution are far less accessible to the
defendants that to the government. 6'
The Court disagreed with this rationale. It explained
that if a selective prosecution claim were well
founded, a defendant should be able to prove, without difficulty, that similarly situated non-black defendants were treated differently.6 The Court concluded that requiring a threshold showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons adequately balances the government's interest in vigorous prosecution and the defendant's interest in
avoiding selective prosecution.6
C. DISSENT
Justice Stevens dissented from the majority
opinion. He stated that the possibility of political or
racial animosity infecting a decision to institute
criminal proceedings cannot be ignored.6 For that
reason, the prosecutor's broad discretion should not
be completely unbridled. 65 Even if respondents failed
to carry their burden of showing that similarly situated persons were not prosecuted, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering discovery. 66
The district court should have been able to take judicial notice of the government's acting unfairly and
- 7United States Sentencing Commission 1994 Annual Report 107 (Table 45)
5 1Id. at41 (Table 13).
59Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
6'ArmstrongII, 48 F.3d at 1514.
61 Id. (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985)).
6Arnmtrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1489.
116 S. Ct. at 1489.
MId. at 1492.

6 d.
66d.
at 1494.
67
Id.

demand information from their files to support or

6
refute respondents' selective prosecution claim. '

The Anti Drug AbuseAct of 1 9 8 6 61 and subsequent
legislation established extremely high penalties for
the possession and distribution of crack cocaine.0
In addition, the state law criminal justice system

involved the absence of mandatory minimums, the
existence of parole, and lower baseline penalties.

Hence, punishment under federal law far more severe then under state law.70 Although 65 percent of
crack users are white, they represent only 4 percent
of federal offenders.7 ' Black defendants comprised

88 percent of federal crack offenders.72 During the

first eighteen months that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were in force, blacks received sentences
40 percent longer than whites. 73 These figures
showed the heightened danger of arbitrary enforce-

ment and the need for careful scrutiny of any
colorable claim of discriminatory enforcement. 74
IV. CONCLUSION
The United StatesSupreme Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals on the ground that
respondents did not put forth some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements
of a selective prosecution claim. Specifically, they
failed to identify individuals who were not black,
could have been prosecuted for the offenses for
which respondents were charged, but were not so
prosecuted. This "similarly situated" requirement is
harsh. In Armstrongl,'7 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals favored a more relaxed standard of granting discovery in selective prosecution claims. The
court focused on the evidentiary problems that defendants face when trying to prove a colorable basis
for selective prosecution. 76 Recent United States
Supreme Court cases indicate a trend toward abolishing programs specifically intended to benefit minorities. 77 This trend suggests that the mentality of

America is becoming increasingly unsympathetic to
621 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
6Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. at 1492.
70116

S. Ct. at 1493.

71Id.
721d.

73Id.
74Id. at 1494.
75 ArmstrongII, 48 E3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
76
48 E3d at 1514.
77 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).

minorities. The Court and the media reflect a general belief that discrimination has been eradicated
and that persons who alleges that they have been
subjected to discriminatory treatment are paranoid.
The new"color blind" view of America will make it
more difficult to convince the courts that racial discrimination is still present in the American criminal
justice system. Hence, requiring a defendant to show
that similarly situated defendants were not prosecuted will prevent any defendant from bringing a
sucessful discrimination claim against the government.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
James M. Williams

